wlpte, evils of fault (for that is a thing which the Democritic Atheists utterly explode in the genuine sense of it), but the evils of pain and trouble; which they dispute concerning, after this manner* [a]The supposed Deity and maker*of the world was either willing to abolish all evils, but notable; or he was able, but not willing; or thirdly, he was neither willing nor able ; or else lastly, he was both able and willing. This latter iff the only thing that answers fully to the notion of a God. Now that the supposed creator of all things was not thus both able and willing to abolish all evils, is plain, because then there would iiave been no evils at all left. Wherefore, since there is such a deluge of evils overflowing all, it . must needs be, that either he was willing and not able to remove them, and then he was impotent; or else he was able and not willing, and then he was envious; or lastly, he was neither able nor - willing, and then be was both impotent and .envious. *

xvii. In the twelfth place, the Atheists further dispute in this manner. If the world were made by any Deity, then it would be governed by a providence ; and if there were any providence, it must appear in human affairs. But here it is plain, that all is Tohu and Bohu, chaos and confusion ; things happening alike to all, to the wise and foolish/ religious and impious, virtuous and vicious. (For these names the Atheist cannot choose but make use of, though, by taking away natural morality, they really destroy the things.) From whence it is concluded, that all things float up and down, as they are agitated and driven by

[a] Vide L'actai de Ira Dei, cap. xiii. p. 942. edit. Walchii.